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ABSTRACT 
Foodborne illness outbreaks linked to the consumption of fresh produce expose fruit and 
vegetable growers to uncertain legal and compensatory costs associated with product liability 
actions. Product liability insurance protects farmers against the risk of financial loss from 
product liability actions and may create opportunities for market expansion, but insights from 
recent focus groups suggest that Tennessee farmers may perceive this insurance coverage as cost 
prohibitive. This study evaluates the factors influencing adoption of product liability insurance 
among Tennessee fruit and vegetable producers. Using data from a 2013 survey of Tennessee 
fruit and vegetable farmers, factors influencing the adoption decision are first evaluated using a 
single-equation probit regression. Results from the first regression approach suggest that 
perceptions of product liability risk and acres in fruit and vegetable production are positive 
determinants of adoption. The model was then expanded to a two-stage probit regression 
approach to account for simultaneity between adoption of product liability insurance and product 
liability risk perceptions. Findings from the two-stage regression approach suggest that 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Demand for fresh produce has recently increased in the US. In addition to improved year-
round availability associated with rising imports, widespread governmental efforts to synthesize 
an evolving body of knowledge about the health benefits associated with consuming fresh 
produce is among the key drivers of change (Cook, 2011). Numerous federal programs aim to 
increase US consumption of fresh produce as a means to combat obesity, which is largely 
concentrated in the Southeastern states (CDC, 2015). However, concerns over the prevalence of 
foodborne illness outbreaks related to fresh produce have the potential to deter market growth for 
fresh fruits and vegetables (Boys, 2013). 
Foodborne illnesses affect nearly 48 million people each year in the US (CDC, 2013). 
Hoffmann, Maculloch, and Batz (2015) estimated that, on average, the annual economic burden 
imposed by fifteen major foodborne pathogens is $15.5 billion. On the other hand, Scharff 
(2015) suggested that foodborne illnesses generated an estimated $54.9 billion in health-related 
costs annually in the US. Between 1998 and 2008, produce accounted for 46 percent of 
foodborne illnesses and 23 percent of deaths reported to the CDC’s Foodborne Disease Outbreak 
Surveillance System (Painter et al., 2013). DeWaal et al. (2015) linked produce to more 
foodborne illnesses than any other food group using a compilation of foodborne illness outbreaks 
reported to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention between 2003 and 2012. 
Due to growing concern about food safety issues associated with fresh produce, 
improving safety throughout the food supply chain has become a national health objective. As a 
result, food safety regulation in the US has transformed dramatically in recent years. Food safety 
issues related to fresh produce have also spurred interest in improved traceability, or the ability 
to track food products “from the grower to the consumer’s plate” (Wilson and Clarke, 1998). For 
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example, following the 2006 E. coli outbreak linked to spinach, the farm that produced the 
contaminated spinach could only be identified after an extensive investigation had taken place, 
exposing the need for improved traceability in the produce industry (Pouliot and Sumner, 2008). 
Innovations in traceability systems improve the likelihood of identifying responsible parties in 
the case of a foodborne illness outbreak, ultimately increasing grower accountability for potential 
foodborne illness outbreaks (Buzby, Frenzen, and Rasco, 2001). In turn, producers are 
increasingly susceptible to legal action by consumers claiming monetary damages for illnesses 
caused by contaminated food products, also called product liability (PL) risk (Rejesus and 
Dunlap, 2009). 
 Public and private regulation, monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms designed to 
reduce the incidence of foodborne illness outbreaks have primarily focused on improving food 
safety standards (Havinga, 2012). For example, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Food 
Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), which was finalized in November 2015, established the first 
science-based minimum safety standards for growing, harvesting, packing, and handling fruits 
and vegetables for human consumption (USFDA, 2016). Unaddressed by new regulations is the 
extent to which firms are liable for foodborne illness (Boys et al. 2015).  
Monetary losses associated with litigation can be sizable. These include costs associated 
with jury verdicts (i.e., financial compensation to a plaintiff), court costs, and legal fees, the 
latter of which may be incurred regardless of legal conclusions (Henson and Hooker, 2001). 
Mahdu (2015) reviewed the outcomes of 511 foodborne illness lawsuits between 1979 and 2014, 
finding that compensation to successful plaintiffs ranged from $151 to $6.2 million. 
 Whereas intermediate and retail outlets often place specific PL insurance requirements on 
their suppliers, direct-to-consumer market outlets generally have less explicit requirements of 
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this type (Holcomb, Palma, and Velandia, 2013; Velandia et al., 2014). Generally, direct-to-
consumer outlets such as farmers markets and Community Supported Agriculture have limited or 
no requirements specifically associated with PL insurance (Boys, 2013). Findings from a 2011 
survey of Tennessee fruit and vegetable producers found that fresh produce growers in 
Tennessee made nearly 75% of their sales through direct-to-consumer outlets (Wolanin, 2013). 
Therefore, Tennessee fruit and vegetable producers may be less likely to carry PL insurance than 
farmers who sell more of their produce through intermediate or retail outlets. 
Producers can mitigate their exposure to PL risk through precautionary measures such as 
third-party audits and/or certifications. Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) certification1, for 
example, involves an on-farm audit by a third-party to verify adherence to guidelines or industry-
specific protocols upheld by the auditing organization (Rejesus, 2009; Critzer and Wzselaki, 
2012). Additionally, compliance with quality assurance standards may serve as a legal defense 
against claims of negligence (Connally, 2009). While precautionary measures such as GAP 
compliance reduce the risk of microbial contamination, the economic benefit of reducing 
microbial risk only accrue to the producer in a fooborne illness outbreak (Rejesus, 2009). 
Nonetheless, there may be indirect benefits such as access to market outlets requiring this type of 
certification. 
Previous studies have generally evaluated produce farmer perceptions of risk (e.g. 
Hanson et al., 2004; Ali and Kapoor, 2008; Velandia et al., 2014), and the use of GAP as a risk 
management strategy among them (Sriwichailamphan et al., 2008; Kersting and Wollni, 2012; 
Marine et al., 2016). However, less understood are the factors influencing the adoption of PL risk 
                                                
1 GAP audits for fresh produce are offered by numerous organizations and vary in scope (Critzer and Wszelaki, 
2012), but many organizations, including the USDA Produce GAP audit program, use harmonized standards 
promoted by United Fresh Produce Association (USDA-AMS, 2015; UFPA, 2016). 
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management strategies, such as PL insurance (Ivey, LeJeune, and Miller, 2012; Boys, 2013). The 
objective of this research is to determine the factors influencing the adoption of PL insurance 
among Tennessee fruit and vegetable producers. 
In addition to providing protection against PL risk, PL insurance may be used as a 
marketing or differentiation strategy (Boys, 2013). Thus, adopting PL insurance may help 
producers access new market opportunities. Farmer inability to adopt PL insurance may also 
imply market exclusion and marginalization (Handschuch, Wollni, and Villalobos, 2013). 
Therefore, understanding the factors influencing the adoption of PL insurance by fruit and 
vegetable producers is an important step in determining measures that policy makers can 
implement to equip Tennessee producers with tools necessary to maintain their competitiveness 
under a new regulatory environment while providing safe products to consumers. This 




CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Hardaker et al. (2015) refers to ‘risk’ as exposure to uncertain outcomes. Therefore, by 
engaging in the production and sale of food products, which are affected by many factors both 
within and beyond the farmer’s control, farmers are exposed to the risk of loss or harm to others. 
Previous literature provides numerous classifications for the types of risks faced by farmers. 
Generally, these include production, market, financial, legal, environmental, and human risk 
(Harwood et al., 1999; Hardaker et al., 2015).  
In addition to facing price and production risk, fresh produce growers are exposed to risk 
related to the perishable nature of fruits and vegetables in addition to PL risk (Ligon, 2001; 
Martinez et al., 2010). For example, due to the highly perishable nature of fresh produce, fruit 
and vegetable growers generally have less time to pursue alternate buyers and/or more favorable 
prices after harvesting their produce (Schieffer and Vassalos, 2015). Many fresh produce 
growers rely on local direct-to-consumer marketing channels, intermediated channels, or a 
combination of the two (Low et al., 2015). Direct-to-consumer marketing channels, in particular, 
may increase producer exposure to PL risk (Dunn, Harper, and Greaser, 2000). 
Microbial contamination of fresh produce can occur at any point during production, 
processing, distribution, or preparation (CDC, 2016). Since fresh fruits and vegetables are often 
consumed raw with minimal processing, pathogen contamination is an inherent risk faced by 
produce farmers (Tauxe et al., 1997). Further, producers selling directly to consumers could 
easily be linked to a contaminated product, decreasing the chances of a legal outcome favoring 
farmers in the case of PL litigation (Buzby, Frenzen, and Rasco, 2001). 
The adoption of risk management tools among US row crop farmers has been intensively 
studied by agricultural economists, specifically the utilization of risk management tools such as 
 6 
crop insurance, forward contracting, and spreading sales (Knight et al., 1989; Goodwin and 
Schroeder, 1994; Mishra and El-Osta, 2002; Sherrick et al., 2004; Velandia et al., 2009). In 
contrast, research regarding the adoption of risk management tools by fruit and vegetable 
producers is limited (Hanson et al., 2004; Uematsu and Mishra, 2011; Vassalos and Li, 2016). 
Several studies have evaluated the factors influencing the adoption of GlobalGAP and 
GAP certification2, while others have focused on the adoption of food safety and quality 
standards among fruit and vegetable producers  (e.g., Sriwichailamphan et al., 2008; Kersting 
and Wollni, 2012; Handschuch, Wollni, and Villalobos, 2013; Adalja and Lichtenberg, 2015; 
Marine et al., 2016). In the area of PL risk, there are a few studies that have examined attributes 
influencing jury verdicts in food product liability lawsuits (Buzby, Frenzen, and Rasco, 2001; 
Mahdu, 2015). Only one study analyzed the adoption of PL insurance among specialty crop 
producers (Boys, 2013). 
Sriwichailamphan et al. (2008) evaluated the factors influencing GAP adoption among 
pineapple farmers in Thailand. Their analysis found that adoption of GAP was significantly 
influenced by age, average price received by farmers, average yield, use of marketing contracts, 
environmental concerns, buyer requirements, and farmer progressiveness. 
Handschuch, Wollni, and Villalobos (2013) examined the adoption of voluntary food 
safety and quality standards among Chilean raspberry producers. They also evaluated the impact 
of adoption on farm performance. Their findings suggest that gender, education, farm size, and 
membership in a farming association affected adoption of voluntary food safety and quality 
standards. Implementation of these standards was found to positively affect farmer income. 
                                                
2 GAP and GlobalGAP certifications are risk management tools that farmers can use to protect their businesses 
against PL risk. 
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Marine et al. (2016) used survey data from Maryland and Delaware vegetable growers to 
evaluate the influence of vegetable acres farmed, farming experience, and market channels used 
to sell products on the likelihood of adopting various on-farm food safety practices including 
GAP certification. The authors found that farm size and market channels used to sell produce 
influenced GAP adoption. 
Adalja and Lichtenberg (2015) used data from a national survey of US fruit and vegetable 
growers to evaluate the influence of farm size and farming practices use on the adoption of food 
safety measures required by the Food Safety Modernization Act’s Standards for the growing, 
harvesting, packing, and holding of produce for human consumption (i.e., Produce Rule). The 
study also evaluated differences in costs associated with implementing these food safety 
measures. After controlling for differences in crop type, marketing channels, and farming 
practices, they found no significant impact of farm size on the use of the various food safety 
measures evaluated. In contrast, farm size influenced the cost of complying with food safety 
measures. Their results suggest that the cost of food safety measures regulated by the FSMA’s 
Produce Rule exhibit economies of scale and support the notion that compliance by smaller firms 
is more burdensome. 
Boys (2013) summarized data from a survey of small- and medium-scale producers 
located in the southeastern US that evaluated producer motivations and barriers to adopt an 
insurance providing PL coverage. Buyer requirements, liability concerns, and interest in 
improving marketing strategies were found to be the main motivations for the adoption of an 
insurance policy providing PL coverage. Respondents indicated that the benefits of having this 
type of insurance policy included improved market access, mitigated risk of litigation, and 
improvements in farm reputation. 
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The Role of Perceptions of Risk on the Adoption of Risk Management Tools 
Several studies have investigated the role of producer perceptions and producer 
understanding of risk on the adoption of risk management tools (e.g., Boggess, Anaman, and 
Hanson, 1985; Harwood et al., 1999; Hall et al., 2003; Velandia et al., 2009; Le and Cheong, 
2010). In the context of PL risk, Ivey, LeJeune, and Miller (2012) examined vegetable producer 
perceptions and knowledge about food safety, food contamination, and GAP using data from a 
survey of vegetable producers located in Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and Kentucky. Their analysis 
found that most vegetable producers do not believe contamination is most likely to occur on the 
farm. However, these producers indicated interest in obtaining information about sources of 
product contamination and GAP guidelines.  
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CHAPTER III: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Foodborne illnesses linked to the consumption of fruits and vegetables expose producers 
to the risk of financial loss associated with product liability actions. Producer 𝑖 has initial wealth 
of 𝑤, but runs the risk of losing 𝐿 dollars when facing a lawsuit for illness or death associated with 
the production and sale of contaminated products (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995). The 
probability of producer 𝑖 incurring loss 𝐿, which encompasses compensatory costs to victims, court 
costs, and legal fees, is denoted by 𝑝. The probability of loss is assumed to be a function of farm-
specific factors including, but not limited to, sales volume, type of produce farmed and sold, and 
management practices (e.g., GAP certification). If no contamination occurs, the producer’s wealth 
is unaffected. If contamination resulting in foodborne illness and/or death occurs, but a consumer 
of the contaminated product does not seek compensation from the court system, producer 𝑖’s 
wealth also remains unchanged. Using a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function 
(Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995) producer 𝑖’s expected utility function is  
(1)                                     𝑈(𝑤) = 1 − 𝑝 𝑢 𝑤 + 𝑝𝑢 𝑤 − 𝐿 . 
Consider the availability of insurance with premium 𝜋, which is assumed to be a function 
of producer i's gross annual sales (Spilker, 2015). The indemnity amount 𝐼 is paid by the insurance 
provider for actual economic losses incurred by producer 𝑖. Pursuant to the insurance contract, the 
insurance provider agrees to indemnify losses incurred by the producer up to a specified level of 
coverage, 𝑞, such that 𝐼 ≤ 𝑞. Producer’s 𝑖 expected wealth when PL insurance is purchased is 𝑤 −
𝜋. In contrast, producer 𝑖’s wealth when loss 𝐿 occurs is 𝑤 − 𝜋 − 𝐿 + 𝐼. Producer 𝑖’s expected 
utility of being insured is 
(2)                              𝑈1 𝑤 = 1 − 𝑝 𝑢 𝑤 − 𝜋 + 𝑝𝑢 𝑤 − 𝜋 − 𝐿 + 𝐼 ; 
s.t. 𝐼 < 𝐿. 
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Subtracting equation (1) from (2) results in 
(3)                 ∆𝑈 = 𝑈1 . − 𝑈 . . 
Assuming producer 𝑖 makes decisions consistent with maximizing his or her expected utility over 
wealth, the producer will adopt PL insurance if ∆𝑈 > 0, or where the expected utility of adopting 
insurance exceeds the expected utility of not adopting insurance such that 𝑈1 . > 𝑈 . . Since ∆𝑈 
is unobservable, producer 𝑖’s decision to purchase PL insurance, 𝑦, is modeled as a dichotomous 
variable, such that 
(4)                                                𝑦 = 1	𝑖𝑓	∆𝑈 > 0	0	𝑖𝑓	∆𝑈 ≤ 0. 
Product Liability Insurance and State Contingent Benefits 
 It can be shown that producer 𝑖’s expected utility of adopting insurance depends on the 
realization of loss. First, consider the case where loss 𝐿 is realized. Factoring out the probability 
of loss, 𝑝, from equation (3) leads to 
(5)                𝑝[𝑢 𝑤 − 𝜋 − 𝐿 + 𝐼 − 𝑢 𝑤 − 𝐿 ]. 
Hence, if 𝐿 is realized, the producer benefits from purchasing PL insurance only if 𝐼 > 𝜋 + 𝐿. If 
no loss occurs, 1 − 𝑝 can be factored out of equation (3): 
(6)                      (1 − 𝑝)[𝑢 𝑤 − 𝜋 − 𝑢 𝑤 ]. 
Therefore, if insurance is purchased and no loss occurs, the insurance premium, 𝜋, accrues to the 
producer as a negative benefit and, thus, PL insurance would not be preferred.  
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CHAPTER IV: DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Data 
Data for this study was obtained from a mail survey of Tennessee fruit and vegetable 
producers conducted in 2013. The sample consisted of 495 fruit and vegetable producers listed in 
the Tennessee Department of Agriculture’s Pick Tennessee Products program website (TDA, 
2015). On April 1, 2013, the first survey mailing was distributed along with a cover letter 
explaining the purpose of the study and a prepaid return envelope. Postcard reminders were sent 
out on April 19, 2013, followed by a final wave of mailings to producers who had not yet 
completed the survey on April 29, 2013. Of the 495 surveys mailed, 163 were completed and 
returned. Out of 163 returned surveys, 18 responses were from producers who either no longer 
produce and/or sell fruits and/or vegetables, or farmers who produce fruits and vegetables solely 
for personal consumption. These observations were eliminated, resulting in a usable response 
rate of 29.3% (145). 
Survey respondents were introduced to the concept of PL insurance as an instrument that 
could help protect producers by limiting the extent of their exposure to risk associated with 
consumer claims of injury caused by harmful or contaminated products. The survey included 
questions about producer risk perceptions, familiarity with and use of risk management tools 
including PL insurance, cost and level of coverage associated with PL insurance, reason for not 
using PL insurance, sources of information about PL insurance, and general farm operator and 
farm business characteristics (see survey instrument in Appendix B). 
Secondary data on county-level characteristics was obtained from the 2012 Census of 
Agriculture (USDA-NASS, 2012). Age distributions of fruit and vegetable growers were used to 
determine the extent to which the sample was representative of the population under 
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consideration. The number of farms with vegetables, potatoes, and melons harvested for fresh 
market was also obtained for use in the regression models. 
Empirical Model 
Socioeconomic and demographic factors that influence risk attitudes may also affect risk 
management decisions, such as the choice to purchase crop insurance (Smith and Baquet, 1996). 
Hence, previous literature evaluating the factors influencing risk attitudes and risk management 
adoption decisions served as natural starting points to identify which variables to include in the 
adoption equations.   
Age, experience, and educational attainment have been considered by several studies as 
potential determinants of risk management decisions (e.g., Shapiro and Brorsen, 1988; Smith and 
Baquet, 1996; Mishra and El-Osta, 2002; Sherrick et al., 2004; Mohammed and Ortmann, 2005; 
Bukenya and Nettles, 2007; Sriwichailamphan et al., 2008; Velandia et al., 2009; Uematsu and 
Mishra, 2011). 
More experienced farmers may be more likely to anticipate risks associated with 
producing and marketing agricultural products and, thus, more likely to use strategies such as 
insurance to manage risk (Sherrick et al., 2004; Velandia et al. 2009). However, experienced 
farmers may be more diversified in their portfolios, better able to self-insure against losses, and 
wealthier (Smith and Baquet, 1996). If so, more experienced farmers may be less likely to adopt 
insurance to manage risk, particularly if they have taken alternative measures to manage risk. For 
example, Mohammed and Ortmann (2005) found that older, more experienced farmers were less 
likely to purchase livestock insurance. The authors suggested that more experienced farmers may 
have accumulated enough knowledge over time to cope with income variability without 
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insurance (Mohammed and Ortmann, 2005). Experience (EXP) is hypothesized to be negatively 
correlated with PL insurance adoption. 
Smith and Baquet (1996) and Mishra and El-Osta (2002) found that education is 
positively correlated with the adoption of crop insurance. Educational attainment may augment a 
farmer’s ability to gather information about his or her risk exposure, including the potential 
consequences of adverse outcomes (Mishra and El-Osta, 2002). Thus, education (COLLEGE) is 
expected to positively influence the adoption of PL insurance. Further, education may be 
correlated with wealth through its effect on off-farm wages (Mishra and El-Osta, 2002). Without 
an alternative measure of financial leverage, such as the debt-to-asset ratio (e.g., Velandia et al. 
2009), wealth may otherwise be difficult to adequately control for. 
The extent to which producers are liable for damages caused by defective products varies 
from state to state (Buzby, Frenzen, and Rasco, 2001). In Tennessee, a producer who abides by 
federal or state statutes or administrative regulations “prescribing standards for design, 
inspection, testing, manufacture, labeling, warning, or instructions for use of a product” is able to 
raise a rebuttable presumption that the product was not in an unreasonably dangerous condition 
at the time of production3. Thus, a producer who demonstrates compliance with GAP standards, 
which are based on federal guidelines designed to prevent foodborne illness outbreaks, not only 
mitigates the risk of such an event occurring, but also reduces the likelihood of being found 
guilty if a foodborne illness outbreak is linked to any product from his/her farm (Connally, 
2009). Thus, it is hypothesized that GAP certified and/or trained producers (GAP) are less likely 
to adopt an insurance product providing PL coverage.  
                                                
3 Tennessee Code, Product Liability Actions - Tennessee Code Annotated (TCA) § 29-28-104. 
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Several studies have examined the influence of farm size and gross farm sales on the 
adoption of agricultural risk management strategies (e.g., Knight et al., 1989; Mishra and El-
Osta, 2002; Velandia et al., 2009; Uematsu and Mishra, 2011). Larger firms have a greater 
capacity to absorb costs associated with a risk management strategy, particularly if these costs 
have a relatively large fixed cost component. For example, Marine et al. (2016) found that larger 
vegetable farms are more likely to implement GAP than smaller farms. Farm size and farm sales 
may also reflect levels of risk exposure both in terms of the likelihood of occurrence and the 
amount of assets at risk. Thus, an increase in acres in fruit and vegetable production (ACRE) is 
hypothesized to have a positive effect on the probability of adopting PL insurance. 
Demand for insurance is expected to be greater for producers who face a higher 
likelihood of exposure to insurable risk (Sherrick et al., 2004). Risk exposure has been measured 
by variables indicating whether a farm produces fruits and vegetables that are considered “high 
risk” (i.e., fresh produce that is highly susceptible to contamination). It is hypothesized that 
producers growing high-risk products (CANTALOUPE, LETTUCE) are more likely to adopt PL 
insurance (Redman, 2007). Growers of “high-risk” products may be more likely to take actions 
to protect themselves from potential adverse outcomes associated with selling contaminated 
products. For example, Velandia et al. (2014) found that farmers who produce high-risk fruits 
and vegetables, such as lettuce and cantaloupes, are less likely to overlook PL risk. 
Risk preferences are also important factors to consider when evaluating the decision to 
adopt insurance products (Petrolia, Landry, and Coble, 2013; Botzen and van den Bergh, 2012). 
Previous studies have employed several methods measure individual risk attitudes. For example, 
Petrolia, Landry and Coble (2013) incorporated experiment-based measures of risk aversion into 
their model of flood insurance adoption via a real-money experiment, whereby survey 
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respondents make pairwise choices between possible risks of loss and chances of gains. The 
authors found that their measure of risk aversion to loss was positively correlated with the 
decision to adopt flood insurance (Petrolia, Landry, and Coble, 2013). Botzen and van den Bergh 
(2012), who also focused on flood insurance adoption decisions, included an explanatory 
variable representing the use of alternative insurance policies by an individual as an indicator of 
revealed risk attitudes. Their findings suggested that the indicator of revealed risk preferences 
was significant and positively correlated with the decision to adopt flood insurance (Botzen and 
van den Bergh, 2012). In this analysis, variables indicating producer use of strategies other than 
PL insurance were incorporated as proxies of risk preference. The alternative strategies 
considered relate to personal and business risks faced by farmers. It is hypothesized that the 
extracted factors (FACTOR1, FACTOR2) will be positively correlated with the probability of 
adopting PL insurance. 
Overstreet, Cegielski, and Hall (2013) suggest that attitude and social pressure (e.g., 
interaction-driven norms) are strongly correlated with the adoption of preventative innovations 
that do not provide immediate benefit. However, as noted by Marra, Pannell, and Ghadim 
(2003), theoretical and empirical literature often fails to adequately consider the influence of 
risk, uncertainty, and learning as attitudes that may be the result of an individual mindset or 
social pressure on adoption decisions. An example of individual mindset or social pressure 
characteristics that could influence adoption decisions is perceptions of risk, defined as the 
awareness of PL risk as a risk faced when selling produce for human consumption.  It is 
hypothesized that a producer who is aware of PL risk associated with selling fruits and 
vegetables (RISKP) may be more likely to adopt PL insurance. 
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Finally, using results from a study evaluating small and medium scale (SMS) producer 
motivations and barriers to purchase food PL insurance, Boys (2013) note that buyer 
requirements and interest in improving marketing strategies influence producer decisions to 
purchase PL insurance. Producers making a greater percentage of their sales through direct-to-
consumer outlets generally face less stringent requirements related to PL insurance. Thus, it is 
hypothesized that an increase in the percentage of sales made through direct-to-consumer outlets 





CHAPTER V: ESTIMATION METHODS 
Probit Regression 
The insurance adoption decision is modeled as a random utility function (Greene, 2003). 
Underlying the observed adoption decision, 𝑦, in equation (4) is the unobservable latent variable 
∆𝑈, which represents the propensity to adopt PL insurance. Stated differently, ∆𝑈 is the excess 
utility of adopting this risk management tool (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012). The latent 
variable ∆𝑈 in equation (3) is hypothesized to be a function of exogenous covariates, 𝑥, such that 
(7)           ∆𝑈 = 𝑥=𝛽 + 𝜀, 
where 𝛽 is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and 𝜀 is a random disturbance term. 
Combining the relationship between the observed choice, 𝑦, in equation (4) and the latent 
variable, ∆𝑈, in equation (3), the probability of adopting PL insurance is defined as 
     Pr 𝑦 = 1 𝑥 = Pr ∆𝑈 > 0	 𝑥); 
     = Pr 𝑥=𝛽 + 𝜀 > 0	 	𝑥 ; 
(8)     = Pr 𝜀 > 	−𝑥=𝛽	 𝑥); 
     = 𝐹 𝑥=𝛽 , 
where 𝐹	(∙) is the cumulative distribution function of 𝜀 (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). A standard 
normal distribution (i.e. 𝜇 = 0 and 𝜎F = 1) is assumed, thus a probit regression is used in the 
analysis: 
(9)   Pr ∆𝑈 > 0	 𝑥) = Pr 𝑦 = 1	 𝑥) = 	𝐹 𝑥=𝛽 = 	Φ 𝑥=𝛽 , 
where Φ	(∙) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The corresponding log 
likelihood function is 
(10)   ln 𝐿 = [𝑦𝑙𝑛LMNO Φ 𝑥=𝛽 + 1 − 𝑦 ln	{1 − Φ 𝑥=𝛽 }]. 
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Marginal Effects of Continuous and Discrete Explanatory Variables 
The marginal effect of a continuous variable is 





𝛽 = 𝜙 𝑥=𝛽 𝛽, 
where 𝜙(∙) is the standard normal density corresponding to the cumulative distribution Φ(∙). For 
the case of a dummy variable, the marginal effect is 
(12)    Pr[ 𝑥(V), 𝑑 = 1] − Pr[ 𝑥 V , 𝑑 = 0],  
where 𝑥 V  represents the mean values of all other covariates in the model (Greene, 2003). 
Two-Stage Simultaneous Probit Regression 
 In the case of PL insurance adoption, there may be factors that influence the adoption 
decision which are simultaneously determined with the adoption decision itself. Assuming that 
perceptions of PL risk influence producer decisions to adopt PL insurance, and it may be the case 
that the adoption of PL insurance influences producer perceptions of PL risk. For example, farm 
and farmer characteristics have been found to influence farmer adoption of risk management 
tools (Velandia et al., 2009; Akinola, 2014), and farmer risk perception (Dosman, Adamowicz, 
and Hrudey, 2001); Velandia et al., 2014). Thus, if perception of PL risk is simultaneously 
determined by PL insurance adoption, then the variable representing perception of risk is 
generally correlated with the disturbance term, 𝜀. 
 The consistency of maximum likelihood (ML) estimators from the probit regression rests 
on the assumption that all explanatory variables included in the model are uncorrelated with the 
error term. If this assumption fails (i.e., one of the explanatory variables is correlated with 𝜀), the 
ML estimator does not converge in probability to the population parameter as the sample size 
grows to infinity (Wooldridge, 2003). In the case that perception of PL risk and adoption of PL 
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insurance are jointly determined, one possible estimation method for addressing simultaneity 
between two dichotomous variables is the two-stage simultaneous probit regression (Maddala, 
1983). The two-equation model is  
(13)       ∆𝑈 = 𝛾O𝑦F∗ + 𝛽O=𝑥O + 𝜀O, 
(14)                                                        𝑦F∗ = 𝛾F∆𝑈 + 𝛽F=𝑥F + 𝜀F, 
(15)                  𝑦F = 1 𝑦F∗ > 0 , 
where 𝑦F∗ is the latent variable associated with the observed indicator of perception of PL risk, 
𝑦F, and ∆𝑈 is the latent variable underlying the observed adoption decision, 𝑦, in equation (4). 
Additionally, 𝑥O and 𝑥F are exogenous variables;	𝛽O, 𝛽F, 𝛾O and 𝛾F are vectors of parameters to 
be estimated; and 𝜀O and 𝜀F are random disturbance terms. The reduced forms of (13) and (14) 
are 
(16)             ∆𝑈 = ΠO𝑋 + 𝑣O, 
(17)             𝑦F∗ = ΠF𝑋 + 𝑣F, 
where 𝑋 includes all exogenous variables in 𝑥O and 𝑥F. Because 𝑦F∗ and ∆𝑈 are only observed as 
dichotomous variables 𝑦F and 𝑦, respectively, and 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑣O = 𝜎OF and 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑣F = 𝜎FF, it is only 
possible to estimate ΠO 𝜎O and ΠF 𝜎F. Nonetheless, given that 𝜎OF and 𝜎FF are normalized to one:  
(18)      ΠO 𝜎O = ΠO, 
(19)      ΠF 𝜎F = ΠF. 
A necessary and sufficient condition for the identification of equation (13) is that the 
number of exogenous variables that appear in equation (14) must be at least as large as the 
number of endogenous variables included in (13), also called the order condition (Mallar, 1977; 
Wooldridge, 2002; Greene, 2012). Table 6 presents an overview of the model specifications and 
depicts variable exclusions in each model. 
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After estimating the reduced form equations by probit maximum likelihood, the predicted 
values of 𝑦F∗ and ∆𝑈 are substituted in equations (13) and (14), respectively, and then the 
structural equations are estimated using maximum likelihood.  
In the procedure, the estimated standard errors of the structural equations are based on the 
fitted values of the endogenous variables,	∆𝑈 and 𝑦F∗, whereas the true variables are ∆𝑈 and 𝑦F∗. 
Therefore, adjusted asymptotic covariance should be used. The adjusted asymptotic covariance 
matrices of the structural equations (13) and (14) follow 
(20)             𝛼O= = 𝛾O, 𝛽O= 	 , 
(21)            𝛼F= = 𝛾F, 𝛽F= , 







(23)               𝐴O = 𝜙O𝑎O, 𝐴F = 𝜙F𝑎F, 𝑍 =
ΠF∗𝑋
𝑋 , 








(26)                           𝑊m =
O
L
𝐴OLO 𝛾O 𝑍𝑋=, 
(27)          𝑊n =
O
L
𝑎O𝑎FL= 𝐸 (𝑦O − ΦO)(𝑦F − ΦF) 𝑋𝑍=, 
where 𝜙O and 𝜙F are the standard normal probability density functions associated with the 
estimated latent variables ∆𝑈 and 𝑦F∗ from the reduced form equations (16) and (17) ;	ΦO and ΦF 
are the cumulative distribution functions associated with ∆𝑈 and 𝑦F∗; and ΠF∗𝑋  is the estimated 
vector for 𝑦F obtained from equation (17) (Maddala, 1983). The covariance matrix is calculated 
as 
(28)   𝑊OhO 𝑊O −𝑊m𝑊FhO𝑊n −𝑊n=𝑊FhO𝑊m= +𝑊m𝑊FhO𝑊m= 𝑊OhO, 
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where αqO is the true value of αO and αO is the two-stage estimator. Similarly, the covariance 
matrix of αF is computed by interchanging subscripts 1 and 2 in the definitions of 𝑍 , 𝑊O, 𝑊F, 
𝑊m, and 𝑊n. 
Hausman Specification Test of Endogeneity 
A Hausman specification test was performed to test the null hypothesis that perceptions 
of PL risk are exogenous in PL insurance adoption decisions. Estimates from the two-stage 
simultaneous probit regression can be compared to the estimates produced by the single-equation 
probit regression that ignored simultaneity. The Hausman statistic is 
(29)    𝐻 = 𝛽s − 𝛽S = 𝑉s − 𝑉S hO 𝛽s − 𝛽S , 
where 𝛽s  and 𝛽S are parameter estimates from the single-equation and two-stage simultaneous 
equation, respectively, and 𝑉s  and 𝑉S are their respective covariance matrices of.  
Under the null hypothesis, the Hausman statistic, 𝐻, is distributed 𝜒F with 𝑘 degrees of 
freedom, where 𝑘 equals the number of being evaluated (Hausman, 1978). If adoption of PL 
insurance and perceptions of PL risk are simultaneously determined, the parameter estimates 
from the probit regression model in equation (9) are inconsistent and the null hypothesis will be 
rejected.  
Instrumental Variables Probit Regression  
It is also possible that endogeneity exists due to omitted variables (Wooldridge, 2002). In 
this case, the structural-model approach may be used (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). Under the 
structural-model approach, the latent variable ∆𝑈 in equation (7) is the dependent variable, while 
𝑦F denotes the endogenous regressor. The latent variable ∆𝑈 is modeled as a function of 
exogenous variables, 𝑥O, and the endogenous variable, 𝑦F, such that 
(30)     ∆𝑈 = 𝛾F𝑦F∗ + 𝛽O=𝑥O + 𝜖O, 
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(31)                       𝑦 = 1 ∆𝑈 > 0 , 
where 𝛾O and 𝛽O are vectors of unknown parameters associated with 𝑦F and 𝑥O,	respectively, and 
𝜖O is a random disturbance term. The continuous endogenous regressor 𝑦F∗ is modeled as a 
function of exogenous variables,	𝑥O, and additional instrumental variables, 𝑥w, such that 
(32)                𝑦F∗ = 𝜋O=𝑥O + 𝜋F= 𝑥w + 𝜖F, 
where 𝜋O and 𝜋F are vectors of parameters to be estimated and 𝜖F is a random disturbance term. 
Equation (30) is the structural equation, and (32) is the reduced form equation. The vector 
of instrumental variables, 𝑥w, must include variables that are correlated with 𝑦F∗, but not 
correlated with ∆𝑈 in equation (30). Assuming that the error terms (𝜖O, 𝜖F) are jointly normally 
distributed and that 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝜖O = 1, 
(33)        𝜖O	|	𝜖F = 𝜌𝜖F + 	𝑢, 
where 𝜌 represents the correlation coefficient for (𝜖O, 𝜖F), and 𝑢 is a disturbance term 
independent from 𝑥O, 𝑥w, 𝜖F, and therefore 𝑦F∗ (Wooldridge, 2002). Under the null hypothesis that 
𝜌 = 0, 𝜖O and 𝜖F are independent. Rejecting the null hypothesis indicates that 𝑦F∗ is indeed 
endogenous. The variable of interest is adoption of PL insurance. Predicted values of perception 
of PL risk from the reduced form in equation (32) are substituted into the structural equation in 
(30). 
Factor Analysis of Alternative Risk Management Strategies Used by Producers 
Factor analysis is commonly used to examine the underlying structure of observed (i.e., 
manifest) variables and to reduce the dimensionality of a set of manifest variables (Yong and 
Pearce, 2013). Motivating the decision to conduct a factor analysis is the assumption that there 
exists underlying latent constructs which explain the covariation in a set of manifest variables 
(O’Rourke and Hatcher, 2013). 
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In their examination of the influence of message framings and food safety-related media 
information on consumer risk perceptions of E. coli infection and their attitude towards food 
safety technology, Britwum and Yiannaka (2016) used factor analysis to reduce the 
dimensionality of responses pertaining to consumer trustworthiness rating for information from 
institutions and acceptance ratings of non-conventional food production processes. Oliver (2016) 
utilized factor analysis to identify underlying latent constructs related to farmer attitudes 
associated with the adoption of a hypothetical prescribed grazing program, which were captured 
in ratings of importance and potential outcomes measured via a 5-point Likert scale. 
 In this study, factor analysis was used to examine the patterns underlying producer use of 
risk management strategies other than PL insurance (Table 1), which serve as a proxy of 
producer risk attitudes (Botzen and van den Bergh, 2012). If manifest variables are dichotomous 
in nature, the common factor model, which assumes a linear relationship between manifest 
variables and factors, can generate biased estimates (Matsunaga, 2010; Flora, LaBrish, and 
Chalmers, 2012). This issue is addressed by estimating the relationship between latent constructs 
underlying a set of observed dichotomous variables with a tetrachoric correlation matrix 
(MacCallum et al., 2002). Proposed by Pearson (1900), the tetrachoric correlation is estimated by 
assuming a latent bivariate normal distribution for a pair of dichotomous variables, then 
estimating the correlation between the underlying continuous variables as if they could be 
observed (Greene, 2003). 
For each pair of binary survey items (𝑣O, 𝑣F), which are assumed to have a bivariate 
normal distribution associated with their latent components (𝑋O, 𝑋F) with threshold model 𝑣M = 1 
if 𝑋M > 0, the tetrachoric correlation coefficient 𝑟 is estimated from the joint distribution of 𝑣O 
and 𝑣F (Tallis, 1962). Pairwise estimates of the tetrachoric correlations yield the tetrachoric 
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correlation matrix for use in the factor analysis procedure. The 𝑚-factor model with 𝑛 manifest 
variables is  
(34)           𝑥{ = 𝜆{}𝐹} + 𝑒{, 
where 𝐹} is a vector of latent factors, 𝑥{ is a vector of manifest variables loading onto the 𝑚th 
factor, 𝑒{ is a vector of measurement error, and 𝜆{} is a matrix containing factor loadings of the 
𝑛th manifest variable on the 𝑚th factor (Yong and Pearce, 2013). Factor loadings indicate the 
correlation between the common factor and the manifest variables, and, thus, reflect the amount 
to which a variable contributes to the factor (Kline, 1994; Yong and Pearce, 2013). 
The literature offers varying recommendations as to what constitutes an adequate sample 
size for factor analysis (Williams, Onsman, and Brown, 2010). Some recommendations pertain 
to the number of respondents per variable included in the factor analysis, referred to as the 
subject-to-item ratio and denoted by 𝑁: 𝑝. Costello and Osborne (2005), who examined 303 
research articles that utilized either principal components analysis or exploratory factor analysis, 
found that over 60 percent of the sampled studies using these techniques had a subject-to-item 
ratio of at least 10:1. Other recommendations are concerned with the minimum sample size 
necessary to obtain stable factors, which vary from 100 to 250 observations (Hogarty et al. 
2005). The 𝑁: 𝑝 ratio of the factor analysis model in this study is 17.5:1. The 105 observations 
are within the minimum range suggested in the literature (Hogarty et al., 2005). 
Prior to the extraction of factors, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy was used to determine the suitability of the data for factor analysis. The overall KMO 
index compares the sum of squared correlations of all variables with the sum of squared partial 
correlations between pairs of variables 𝑖, 𝑗, controlling for the effects of remaining variables. The 
KMO index is 
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where 𝑆 = (𝑖, 𝑗; 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗), 𝑟M denotes the correlation of variables 𝑖 and 𝑗, and 𝑎M denotes the anti-
image correlation (Kaiser, 1974). Models with an overall KMO index of 0.5 or less are 
considered unsuitable for factor analysis (Kaiser, 1974). The overall KMO index of the model in 
this study is 0.62.  
The variance explained by an extracted factor is referred to as the eigenvalue of that 
factor. To aid in determining the appropriate number of factors to retain, a scree plot was 
generated by graphing the eigenvalues associated with a factor in descending order against the 
factor number (Figure 1). The scree “test” involves visually examining the scree plot to identify 
the natural break point in the data (Torres-Reyna, 2012). Once a break is identified, the 
researcher retains the number of factors 𝑛 that lie above the natural break point (i.e.,	𝑛 − 1), such 
that, if the natural break point appears at 𝑛 = 5, then 4 factors are retained (Costello and 
Osborne, 2005). 
The scree plot from the factor analysis procedure revealed the presence of a natural 
breaking point around 𝑛 = 2, suggesting the retention of one factor. Under the Kaiser criterion, 
which suggests retaining only those factors with eigenvalues greater than one, only the first 
factor would be retained (Costello and Osborne, 2005). However, the criteria used to determine 
the number of factors to retain are not steadfast, often requiring the researcher to use his or her 
best judgement (Matsunaga, 2010). 
A one-factor model was examined, yielding relatively large uniqueness values and 
indicating that the variables were not well-explained by the single factor (Torres-Reyna, 2012). 
Moreover, the eigenvalue of the second factor (0.85) was relatively close to the Kaiser criterion 
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cutoff of one. Based on these findings, the decision was made to retain two factors, which 
explained 63 percent of the total variance (Table 2). 
Factor loadings were rotated simplify the factor analysis output and to facilitate 
interpretation of factor loadings (Thompson, 2004). Whereas orthogonal rotation assumes that 
factors are uncorrelated, oblique rotation allows correlation between factors. Because risk 
management decisions are expected to be correlated across different domains (Einav et al., 
2010), oblique promax rotation was used. 
The variable indicating farmer use of savings (SAV) had a uniqueness value of 0.68, thus 
the variable was removed and treated as a standalone variable. The factor analysis was 
performed on the remaining four variables and rotated using promax rotation. Two factors 
surfaced from the final analysis (Table 3). Variables that loaded onto Factor 1 were farmer use of 
a commercial business insurance policy (COMB) and farm-structure as a corporation or Limited 
Liability Corporation (LLC). Factor 1 was interpreted as ‘Business-oriented Farmers’. Variables 
that loaded onto Factor 2 were farmer use of a comprehensive liability insurance policy (CLIAB) 
and farmer use of a homeowner’s insurance policy (HOWN). Factor 2 was interpreted as 
‘Community-oriented Farmers’. Producer use of an umbrella insurance policy (UMB) loaded 
onto Factors 1 and 2.  
The factor score coefficients relating the indicator variables to the extracted factors are 
shown in Table 3. Each factor is expressed as a linear combination of the standardized indicator 
variables. Factors 1 and 2 are computed as: 
(36)								𝐹O = −0.0198 ∙ 𝐶𝐿𝐼𝐴𝐵 + 0.5403 ∙ 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐵 − 0.0015 ∙ 𝐻𝑂𝑊𝑁 + 0.2088 ∙ 𝑈𝑀𝐵 
																											+	0.2732 ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝐶, 
and  
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(37)								𝐹F = 0.3561 ∙ 𝐶𝐿𝐼𝐴𝐵 − 0.1501 ∙ 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐵 − 0.3072 ∙ 𝐻𝑂𝑊𝑁 + 0.3860 ∙ 𝑈𝑀𝐵 
																										+	0.1038 ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝐶, 
where CLIAB indicates farmer use of a comprehensive farm liability insurance policy; COMB 
indicates farmer use of a commercial business insurance policy; HOWN indicates farmer use of a 
homeowner’s insurance policy; UMB indicates farmer use of an umbrella insurance policy; and 
LLC indicates a farm structured as a corporation or Limited Liability Corporation (LLC). 
Comparison of Sample Means 
 Characteristics of adopters and non-adopters were compared to evaluate differences in 
characteristics between the two population subsets and to gain insight into the factors influencing 
the adoption decision. Prior to employing t tests, an F test was used to compare the variances of 
variables between the two subsets (Snedecor and Cochran, 1989). Next, t tests, assuming equal 
or unequal variances depending on the outcome of the F test, were used to compare variable 
means for farm, farmer, and county characteristics described above between adopters and non-
adopters. 
Multicollinearity Tests 
Condition indexes were used to detect collinear relationships between explanatory 
variables used in the regressions (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980). Condition indexes were 
evaluated to detect the presence of values exceeding the chosen threshold of 30. Threshold 
values generally range from 15 to 30, with 30 being a commonly used value (Hair et al., 1998). If 
a condition index larger than the threshold value was identified, the variable was examined to 
identify variance proportions above 90 percent. A condition index that exceeds the threshold 
value and accounts for a proportion of variance of 90 percent or above for two or more 
coefficients indicates multicollinearity (Hair et al., 1998).  
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CHAPTER VI: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Evaluation of Data 
Sample descriptive statistics and hypothesized signs are presented in Table 4. Comparing 
the survey sample data to data from the 2012 Census of Agriculture is a useful strategy to 
provide insight into the extent to which the survey sample is representative of Tennessee fruit 
and vegetable producers (Figure 3). Farmers in the 25 to 34 and 55 to 64 age categories are 
slightly overrepresented in the survey sample, and middle-aged farmers (35 to 54 years old) are 
slightly underrepresented compared to the 2012 Census of Agriculture. Overall, the average age 
of the sample is slightly less than the average age of principal operators of Tennessee farms 
according to the 2012 Census of Agriculture, which is 59.2 (USDA-NASS, 2012). 
Sample Means Comparison 
Results from the comparison of characteristics between adopters and non-adopters of PL 
insurance indicate that producers who adopted PL insurance coverage had more acres in fruit and 
vegetable production (Table 5). A greater proportion (78%) of adopters acknowledged facing PL 
risk when selling fruits and vegetables compared to the proportion of non-adopters who indicated 
perceiving this risk (59%) (see question 17, Appendix B). Adopters operated larger fruit and 
vegetable operations (26 acres) than non-adopters (7 acres).  
Probit Regression Results 
Single-equation probit regressions were estimated separately for the adoption of PL 
insurance and the perception of PL risk equations. Parameter estimates and marginal effects 
associated with explanatory variables included in the single-equation adoption model are shown 
in Table 7. Condition indexes were under 20, thus multicollinearity was not likely to hinder 
interpretation of parameter estimates. The likelihood ratio test, which tests the null hypothesis 
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that all regression coefficients were simultaneously equal to zero, was significant at the 5% level. 
Thus, the null hypothesis that all coefficients were simultaneously equal to zero was rejected, 
suggesting significance of the overall model. The model correctly predicted 70% of responses. 
 Perception of PL risk (RISKP) and acres in fruit and vegetable production (ACRE) 
positively affected the adoption of PL insurance coverage, consistent with the hypothesized 
signs. The marginal effect for the perception of PL risk indicates that perceiving PL risk 
increases the probability of adoption by 21%. A one-acre increase in fruit and vegetable 
production corresponds to a 0.7% increase in the probability of adoption. Years of experience 
farming (EXP), educational attainment (COLLEGE), cantaloupe production (CANTALOUPE), 
lettuce production (LETTUCE), percentage of sales made through direct-to-consumer market 
outlets (DIRECT), use of alternative risk management tools (FACTOR1 and FACTOR2), use of 
savings to manage risk (SAV), and GAP training and/or certification (GAP) did not significantly 
affect the probability that a farmer adopted PL insurance coverage. 
Two-Stage Probit Regression Results 
Parameter estimates and marginal effects associated with explanatory variables included 
in the simultaneous equation probit regressions are presented in Table 8. Condition indexes were 
examined for the the equations (13) and (14). Condition indexes remained below 20 for each set 
of explanatory variables, providing no indication that multicollinearity was an issue. The null 
hypothesis that all coefficients were simultaneously equal to zero was tested for each model 
using likelihood ratio tests. With respect to the reduced form equations, the null hypothesis that 
all coefficients were simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 10% and 5% level for the 
adoption and perception models, respectively, suggesting weak significance of the overall 
models, at best. With respect to the structural equations, the null hypothesis that all coefficients 
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were simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 10% level for the adoption and perception 
models, suggesting weak significance of the overall models. 
The Hausman specification test was used to test the null hypothesis that perceptions of PL 
risk are exogenous in PL insurance adoption decisions (Table 9). The null hypothesis was not 
rejected at any conventional level (χ2 = 13.63, with P = 0.254, df = 11), suggesting that the single-
equation models may not be incorrectly specified. 
Instrumental Variables Probit Regression Results 
The instrumental variables probit regression was estimated to test for endogeneity due to 
measurement error. Parameter estimates and marginal effects associated with explanatory 
variables included in the IV probit model are shown in Table 10. The null hypothesis that all 
regression coefficients were simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 1% level (χ2 = 
54.34, df = 11), suggesting significance of the overall model. Of interest was the Wald χ2 test of 
exogeneity, which was used to test the null hypothesis that correlation coefficient in equation 
(33) was equal to zero. The null hypothesis could not be rejected at any conventional level (χ2 = 
0.57, with P = 0.45, df = 1). These findings provide insufficient evidence to conclude that 
perception of PL risk is endogenous due to omitted variables. 
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSIONS 
This study builds on previous agricultural risk management research by analyzing the 
factors influencing PL insurance adoption among Tennessee fruit and vegetable growers. The 
adoption decision was modeled as using a standard probit regression model. Findings suggest that 
farmers who perceived PL risk and farmers with larger fruit and vegetable operations were more 
likely to adopt PL insurance. 
One limitation of the study is that it made strong distributional assumptions about the error 
terms used in the modeling approach. Semi-nonparametric methods have been used to address this 
very issue (e.g., Velandia et al., 2014), which, if incorrectly specified, yields inconsistent 
estimates. A second limitation of the study relates to the framing of the study. To clarify, the 
approach considered PL insurance solely as a risk management tool. Although it briefly discussed 
the benefits of PL insurance in terms of market opportunities, the role which benefits to market 
access play in the adoption decision may be significant.  
 As this research serves merely as a building block, a worthy next step is to analyze the 
distributional assumptions on which the model is based on. If the assumption about normality of 
the error terms is not valid, maximum likelihood estimates would be unreliable. Thus, a semi-
nonparametric approach, such as that taken by Velandia et al. (2014), is a natural starting point for 
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(N = 105) 
SAV Equals one if the farmer uses or has used financial savings and 
zero otherwise 
0.4286 
CLIAB Equals one if the farmer uses or has used a comprehensive farm 
liability insurance policy and zero otherwise 
0.3238 
COMB Equals one if the farmer uses or has used a commercial business 
insurance policy and zero otherwise 
0.1333 
HOWN Equals one if the farmer uses or has used a homeowner’s 
insurance policy and zero otherwise 
0.4952 
UMB Equals one if the farmer uses or has used an umbrella insurance 
policy and zero otherwise 
0.2381 
LLC Equals one if the farm is structured as a corporation or Limited 





Table 2. Eigenvalues and Proportion of Variance Explained by Retained Factors 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
FACTOR1 2.276 1.423 0.455 0.455 
FACTOR2 0.853 0.821 0.171 0.626 
N 105    
LR χ2(10) ab 236.95***       
a Likelihood ratio test of independent versus saturated model. 




Table 3. Rotated Factor Loadings and Uniqueness Values for Alternative Risk Management 
Strategies 
 Factor Loading  
Variablea Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness 
CLIAB -0.068 0.760 0.458 
COMB 0.923 -0.133 0.226 
HOWN -0.047 0.728 0.494 
UMB 0.530 0.460 0.318 
LLC 0.753 0.086 0.376 
a Variables are defined in Table 1. 
  
 48 
Table 4. Variable Definitions, Means, and Hypothesized Signs 
Variable Definition Mean SD Min Max 
Hypothesized 
Sign 
PINS Equals one if the farmer 
carries product liability 
insurance coverage and 
zero otherwise 
0.35 0.48 0.00 1.0  
RISKP Equals one if the farmer 
perceives product 
liability risk and zero 
otherwise 
0.66 0.48 0.00 1.0 + 
EXP Experience farming in 
years 
23.36 16.14 1.00 70.0 − 
COLLEGE Equals one if the farmer 
earned Bachelor or 
Graduate degree and zero 
otherwise 
0.53 0.50 0.00 1.0 + 
ACRE Average fruit and/or 
vegetable acreage grown 
in 2011 and 2012 
13.87 32.01 0.13 214.0 + 
CANTALOUPE Equals one if the farmer 
produced cantaloupes and 
zero otherwise 
0.27 0.44 0.00 1.0 + 
LETTUCE Equals one if the farmer 
produced lettuce and zero 
otherwise 
0.29 0.45 0.00 1.0 + 
DIRECT Percentage of sales made 
through direct-to-
consumer market outlets 
89.15 24.67 0.00 100.0 − 
FACTOR1 Business-oriented farmer 
(extracted Factor 1) 
0.17 0.30 -0.00 1.04 + 
FACTOR2 Community-oriented 
farmer (extracted Factor 
2) 
0.36 0.36 -0.15 1.15 − 
GAP Equals one if farmer is 
Good Agricultural 
Practices trained and/or 
certified and zero 
otherwise 
0.29 0.45 0.00 1.0 − 
FMFARMS Number of operations 
with vegetables harvested 
for fresh market in 
farmer’s county 
16.94 11.46 1.00 84.0  
N 105      
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Table 5. Comparison of Characteristics between Product Liability Insurance Adopters and Non-
Adopters 
Variablea Adopter Mean Non-Adopter Mean t statisticbc 
RISKP 0.7838 0.5882 -2.04** 
EXP 25.8108 22.0294 -1.15 
COLLEGE 0.5405 0.5294 -0.11 
ACRE 25.6149 7.4760 -2.16**† 
CANTALOUPE 0.2703 0.2647 -0.06 
LETTUCE 0.3243 0.2647 -0.64 
DIRECT 85.8696 90.9277 1.00 
FACTOR1 0.2414 0.1297 -1.87* 
FACTOR2 0.3838 0.3395 -0.60 
GAP 0.3243 0.2647 -0.64 
N 37 68  
a Variables are defined in Table 4. 
b Significance at the 10% and 5% levels denoted by * and **, respectively. 
c T-test assuming unequal variance denoted by †. 
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EXP ✓ ✓ 
COLLEGE ✓ ✓ 
ACRE ✓ ✓ 
CANTALOUPE ✓ ✓ 
LETTUCE ✓ ✓ 
DIRECT ✓ ✓ 
CAUTION ✓ ✗ 
GAP ✓ ✗ 
FMFARMS ✗ ✓ 
Note: The symbol ✓ indicates that a variable was included in an equation; the symbol ✗ 
indicates exclusion from an equation.  
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Table 7. Parameter Estimates and Marginal Effects of Independent Variables on the Probability 
of Adoption of Product Liability Insurance Using Probit Regression 
Variablea Coefficientbc Marginal Effect 
RISKP 0.6742** 0.2134 
 (0.3227)  
EXP 0.0086  
 (0.0101)  
COLLEGE -0.1148  
 (0.2813)  
ACRE 0.0196** 0.0062 
 (0.0097)  
CANTALOUPE -0.2864  
 (0.3386)  
LETTUCE 0.3408  
 (0.3538)  
DIRECT 0.0041  
 (0.0069)  
FACTOR1 0.8037  
 (0.4981)  
FACTOR2 0.0186  
 (0.4417)  
SAV -0.1987  
 (0.3150)  
GAP -0.0746  
 (0.3579)  
CONSTANT -1.6602**  
 (0.7874)  
N 105  
LR χ2(11)d 19.32**  
AICe 140.95  
Correctly predicted 74 (70%)   
a Explanatory variables are defined in Table 4. 
b Standard errors shown in parentheses. 
c Significance at the 5% level denoted by **. 
d Likelihood ratio test statistic is calculated as LR = –2[ln LR – ln LU] (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2010). 
e Akaike information criterion calculated as AIC = –2ln L + 2K (Greene, 2012). 
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Table 8. Parameter Estimates and Marginal Effects of Independent Variables on the Probability 
of Adoption of Product Liability Insurance and Probability of Identifying Product Liability Risk 
from Two-stage Simultaneous Probit Regression 
 Adoption (PINS=1) Perception of Risk (RISKP=1) 
Variablea Coefficientbc Marginal Effect Coefficientbc Marginal Effect 
RISKPHAT 1.1047    
 (1.9079)    
PINSHAT   0.7995** 0.3598 
   (0.3843)  
EXP 0.0088  -0.0075  
 (0.0172)  (0.0112)  
COLLEGE -0.3951  0.3334  
 (0.3788)  (0.3337)  
ACRE 0.0246  -0.0215*** -0.0080 
 (0.0266)  (0.0063)  
CANTALOUPE -0.7264  0.6835  
 (0.5567)  (0.4237)  
LETTUCE -0.2058  0.3969  
 (0.7159)  (0.4848)  
DIRECT 0.0052  -0.0104  
 (0.0102)  (0.0080)  
FACTOR1 -0.0057    
 (1.2319)    
FACTOR2 0.1811    
 (0.6154)    
SAV -0.7394* -0.2408   
 (0.4393)    
GAP -0.3443    
 (0.4902)    
FMFARMS   -0.0033  
   (0.0143)  
CONSTANT -1.1101  1.7397*  
 (1.9079)  (0.9013)  
N 105  105  
LR χ2(11/8) 15.9*  13.84*  
AIC 138.27  137.01  
Correctly predicted 73 (69.2%)   74 (70.4%)   
a Independent variables are defined in Table 4. PINSHAT and RISKPHAT are predicted values from equations (13) 
and (14), respectively. 
b Corrected standard errors shown in parentheses. 
c Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Table 9. Results from Hausman Specification Test 
Null hypothesis Hausman χ2 test statistic df P-value 
Correct specification of single-equation probit 
regression predicting adoption (PINS) 
13.6301 11 0.2541 
  
 54 
Table 10. Parameter Estimates and Marginal Effects of Independent Variables on the Adoption 
of Product Liability Insurance Using Instrumental Variables Probit Regression 
Variablea Coefficientbc Marginal Effect 
RISKPd 2.1627** 0.2009 
 (0.8915)  
EXP 0.0045  
 (0.0107)  
COLLEGE -0.2383  
 (0.2449)  
ACRE 0.0150  
 (0.0135)  
CANTALOUPE -0.3948  
 (0.2909)  
LETTUCE -0.0871  
 (0.5436)  
DIRECT 0.0032  
 (0.0062)  
FACTOR1 0.2097  
 (0.8717)  
FACTOR2 0.0844  
 (0.3853)  
SAV -0.4603  
 (0.2955)  
GAP -0.1959  
 (0.3126)  
CONSTANT -1.8268**  
 (0.8296)  
N 105  
Wald test of exogeneity: χ2(1) 0.57  
Wald χ2(11) 54.34***  
AIC 290.57  
Correctly predicted 74(70.4%)   
a Explanatory variables are defined in Table 4. 
b Standard errors shown in parentheses. 
c Significance at the 5% and 1% levels denoted by ** and ***, respectively. 
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Figure 3. Comparison of Age Distribution of Survey Sample and Tennessee Fruit and Vegetable 
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Fruit and vegetable growers face important risks associated with foodborne illness outbreaks. Two 
examples are:  
1) Liability risks in that consumers can take legal actions against producers demanding monetary 
compensation claiming the food they purchased made them sick. 
2) Regulators can issue a product recall or warning because of a foodborne illness outbreak that 
can cause an enormous drop in product sales and an economic loss for all producers including 
those whose product was not contaminated.  
 
Product liability insurance may help protect producers by limiting their possible exposure to risks 
associated with consumers’ claims of injury caused by harmful or contaminated products. Other 
insurance products may help producers cover direct and indirect costs associated with product 
recalls.  Researchers at the University of Tennessee request your help in completing the attached 
survey to design educational tools that help growers understand product liability risks and how to 
protect against these risks.  
 
The enclosed 7-page survey should take about 20 to 25 minutes to complete. This survey is being 
sent to a random sample of 700 Tennessee fruit and vegetable producers. The survey is funded by 
the USDA Specialty Crop Block Grant and is conducted as part of a research and outreach project 
in cooperation with the Tennessee Department of Agriculture. Your participation is strictly 
voluntary, and your response to this survey will be confidential. Responses to the survey will be 
aggregated and published in summary form only.   
 
Please complete the survey and mail it back to us in the enclosed self-addressed postage-paid 
envelope. Your response is extremely valuable, and we look forward to receiving your completed 
survey. The survey results will be made available at http://vegetables.tennessee.edu. Thank you 




*** IMPORTANT *** 
Are you the best person to answer questions about fruit and vegetable marketing and product 
liability on your farm?  If so, please answer the following questions.  If not, please direct this 
questionnaire to the person who makes the fruit and vegetable marketing decisions. Please note 
that questions about your farming operation apply to the 2011 and 2012 crop years. 
 
A.    PLEASE TELL US ABOUT YOURSELF AND YOUR OPERATION 
 
1.    In what county is your primary farming operation located? 
       _________________ County 
2.    In what year were you born? ____________ 
3.    How many years have you farmed? ________years 
4.    How many years have you been selling fruits or vegetables? ________years 
5.    Please indicate your sex (check one)  
              Male 
              Female 
6.    Which of the following describes the highest level of education you have obtained?  
 
               Less than High School/GED  
               High School/GED  
               Some college  
               Associate degree or Vocational school or equivalent  
               Bachelors’ degree 
               Graduate degree 
 
7.    How many persons are in your household, including yourself?  
 
               1 
               2 
               3 
               4 
               5 or more 
 
8.   What is your primary occupation?  
 
                Full time farmer 
                Employed full-time off the farm 
                Employed part-time off the farm 
                Retired and farming part-time 






9.   On the land you owned or rented from others, how many acres did you use to produce fruits, 
vegetables, and other crops in the last two years?  
 
Fruits, Vegetables, and 
Other Crops 
 2011 2012 
Acres in Production Acres in Production 
   Owned  Rented  Owned   Rented 
Fruits and Vegetables     
Other Crops     
 
10.  Which of the following farm products and services were produced on your farm in 2012?          




  Fruits and/or vegetables for fresh market sales   Poultry or Eggs 
  Fruits and/or vegetables for processing   Milk 
  Grains   Beef 
  Hay   Pork 
  Nursery crops, Greenhouse crops, or Christmas 
trees   Lamb or goat meat 
  Nuts   Value-added farm products (e.g. ham, wine, cheese) 
  Other (please list):________________________   Agri-tourism 
 






11.  Did you sell fruits and/or vegetables that you raised in 2011 or 2012? 
             ___Yes, proceed to Question 12 
       ___No, skip to Question 27 
 
12.  Did you sell fruits and/or vegetables purchased from someone else in the last two years? 
        2011:  ____Yes                   2012: ____ Yes             
                          ____ No                              ____ No 
 
13.   Approximately what percentage of your farm’s gross annual sales came from fresh market sales of 
fruits and vegetables in the last two years?  2011_______%      2012_______%   
 
14.   Approximately what percentage of your farm’s gross annual sales came from sales of fruits and 
vegetables for processing in the last two years? 2011 ________%      2012______% 
 
 
IF YOU DID NOT SELL FRUITS AND VEGETABLES YOU RAISED IN THE LAST TWO YEARS, 
PLEASE ANSWER “NO” TO QUESTION 11 AND THEN SKIP TO QUESTION 27. 
 





15.  Which of the following fruits and vegetables did you produce for sale (for fresh market sales or for 
processing) in the last two years? (Check all that apply). 
 
  Apples   Grapes   Snap Beans 
  Bell peppers   Lettuce   Squash 
  Blueberries   Greens   Strawberries 
  Blackberries   Okra   Sweet Corn 
  Broccoli   Onions   Tomatoes 
  Cabbage   Peaches   Turnips 
  Cantaloupes   Pears   Watermelons 
  Cherries   Plums and prunes   Other fruits__________________ 
  Cucumbers and/or Pickles   Pumpkins   Other vegetables _____________ 
 
16.  Mark with an “X” the marketing methods you used in the last two years  in selling fruits and/or 
vegetables and estimate the percentage of your sales made through each method. Mark with an “X” 





(mark with an 
“X”) 
Estimate the 
percentage of sales 
made through this 
method (each 






with an “X”) 
Direct Sales to Consumers: 2011 2012 2011 2012  
On farm sales      
Farmers’ markets      
Community Supported Agriculture 
(CSA)     
 
Roadside stands      
Pick-your-own      
Other direct sales(describe)  
 
___________________________________     
 
Sales to Intermediaries:      
Grower cooperatives      
Wholesale buyers/brokers/packers      
Other farmers      
Other intermediaries (describe)  
 
_______________________________________     
 
Sales to Retail Outlets:      
Grocery stores      
Food cooperatives      
Restaurants      
Institutions (such as schools and 
hospitals)      
Other retail outlets (describe)  
 
_____________________________________      
 100% 100%  
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C.   RISK MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY INSURANCE 
 





18.   Mark an “X” to the left of each risk management option that you use or have used to manage risk in 
your operation. On a scale from 1 to 7 where “1” is not important and “7” is very important,    circle 





Risks Mark with an “X” 
Customer liability associated with injuries caused by harmful products such as 
contaminated fresh products  
Customer liability associated with bodily injury that occurred on the farm premises  
Product recall or warning because of foodborne illness outbreak  
Low sales volume, unsold produce  
Quality problems with produce due to weather, pests, etc.  
Buyer back out, failure to fulfill commitments  
Market fluctuations (e.g., low price, low profits)  
 




Risk Management Options 
     Not 
Important 
                Very 
           Important 
          
 Financial savings/reserves 
 
1       2      3      4     5     6      7 
  Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) or Adjusted Gross Revenue-Lite (AGR-lite) crop insurance 1       2      3      4     5     6       7 
 
  
Actual Production History or APH insurance (Yield Base 
Insurance) 
 
1       2      3      4     5     6       7 
  Product liability insurance policy  1       2      3      4     5     6       7 
  Product recall policy 1       2      3      4     5     6       7 
 
 
       Comprehensive farm liability policy 1       2      3      4     5     6       7 
 
  Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) training/certification 
1       2      3      4     5     6       7 
 
 Commercial business policy 1       2      3      4     5     6       7 
 
 Homeowner’s policy 1       2      3      4     5     6       7 
  Umbrella policy 1       2      3      4     5     6       7 
  Become a corporation or limited liability company (LLC) 1       2      3      4     5     6       7 
 
  Other (describe) _________________________ 




19.  On a scale from 1 to 7, where “1” is not familiar and “7” is very familiar, please    circle   
your familiarity with each insurance coverage option for fresh produce growers. 
 
Risk Management Options   
   Not                             Very                  
Familiar                      Familiar 
Product liability insurance policy 1       2      3      4     5     6      7 
                 Comprehensive farm liability policy 1       2      3      4     5     6      7 
1       2      3      4     5     6      7 
1       2      3      4     5     6      7 
1       2      3      4     5     6      7 
1       2      3      4     5     6      7 
1       2      3      4     5     6      7 
 
 




Commercial business policy 
Product recall policy 
Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) or Adjusted Gross Revenue-Lite 
(AGR-lite) crop insurance 
Actual Production History or APH insurance (Yield Base 
Insurance) 
 
1       2      3      4     5     6      7 
  
Other (describe) _____________________________ 
 









20.   Do you have insurance that provides product liability coverage?  
 
         ____  Yes  
         ____   No → In the space below, please indicate the main reasons why you don’t have  
product liability coverage and then Skip to Question 27:  
                               ___________________________________________________________ 
      ___________________________________________________________ 
      ___________________________________________________________ 
 
         ____   I Don’t Know → Skip to Question 27. 
 
21.   What type of insurance policy do you use to provide product liability coverage? 
 
                    Product liability insurance policy 
              Comprehensive farm liability policy 
              Homeowner’s policy 
              Umbrella policy 
              Commercial business policy 
              Other (please describe)  ___________________________________ 
 
 
The following definition may be helpful: 
Product liability insurance protects producers against consumer claims of injury 
caused by harmful products such as contaminated fresh or value added products. 
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22.   Check the category that best reflects your product liability insurance coverage. 
               
              Under $100,000                                
              $100,000 - $299,999            
              $300,000 - $599,999                         
              $600,000 - $999,999                           
              $1 million - $1.9 million 
              $2 million - $2.9 million 
              $3 million - $3.9 million 
              $4 million - $4.9 million 
              $5 million – up 
 
23.    Check the category that best reflects the annual cost of your insurance coverage. 
 
              Under $1,000                                
              $1,000 - $1,999            
              $2,000 - $2,999                           
                 $3,000 - $3,999 
                 $4,000 – $4,999 
                 $5,000 - up 
  
24.  What are the names of the insurance companies that have provided product liability coverage for 
you? 
        ___________________________________________________________________ 
  ___________________________________________________________________ 
  ___________________________________________________________________ 
 
25.   On a scale of 1 to 7 where “1” is little or no understanding and “7” is great understanding, how well 
do you understand your insurance policy that provides product liability coverage? 
 
Please    circle   a number:     Little Understanding                                     Great Understanding                                                             
                                                                             1……2……3…….4……5……6……7 




Mark box with 
an “X” if 
currently use 
or have used 
Insurance Agent  
Social Networks (e.g. Facebook, twitter)  
Other farmers  
Popular press  
Farm Manager or Consultant  









D.  INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR HOUSEHOLD 
 
27.  Check what percentage of your taxable household income was from farming in the last two years?  
 
         2011          2012 
          None 
          Less than 25% 
          25% to 49% 
          50% to 74% 
          More than 75% 
          None 
          Less than 25% 
          25% to 49% 
          50% to 74% 
                 More than 75% 
  
28.  Check the category that best reflects your taxable household income from both farm and  
       non-farm sources in 2012:  
 
          Under $10,000                               $50,000 - $74,999 
          $10,000 - $14,999                          $75,000 - $99,999                     
          $15,000 - $24,999                          $100,000 - $150,000                                 
          $25,000 - $34,999                          more than $150,000 





Thank you for your time! 
 
Please place the survey in the enclosed self-addressed postage-paid envelope and 
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